Introduction
The District Court of The Hague's decision on 24 June 2015 in the Urgenda versus the Netherlands 1 case has been described as historic as regards its contribution to climate justice.
Although limited in several respects: in terms of its scope ratione personae to the Netherlands, ratione materiae to this country's policies on the mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and ratione temporis up to 2020; its impact could far exceed this range through ripple effects on other jurisdictions, even within the framework of international negotiations on climate change.
Climate justice raises equivocal social and ethical issues. Indeed, theorists disagree on which direction climate justice should take, 2 on who is primarily accountable 3 and who should 1 http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196&keyword=urgenda (English version of the judgment which this commentary refers to).
2 For example, R. Cox, advocates an "energy revolution" as quickly and efficiently as possible, to prevent the already critical condition of the Earth's environment from leading to the fall of Western societies. He considers, in this respect, that justice has a particular role to play. See R. Cox, Revolution justified, Planet Prosperity Foundation, 2012, 328 p. (http://www.revolutionjustified.org/). 3 As described in the "Oslo principles on global climate change obligations", developed and adopted by a group of eminent jurists, regarding States and enterprises, with emphasis on the special role of human rights and the precautionary principle (http://www.osloprinciples.org/principles/). 2 be its main recipients. 4 Concepts and principles with uncertain definitions (polluter pays, common but differentiated responsibilities, equity, etc.) are also at the heart of climate justice issues. 5 Arguments between States over concrete definitions and implications have stalled the ongoing international negotiations on the evolution of the international regime to tackle climate change, negotiations that are expected to lead to a new multilateral agreement in December 2015 in Paris. The weak compromise that emerged from the Warsaw 2013 and Lima 2014 climate change conferences was that each party should define its own "national contribution" and should provide justification for why its proposed GHG emission reduction target is fair and equitable. However, this strategy of voluntary restraint does not seem to have generated sufficient momentum to achieve the level of action recommended by scientists at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and it is unlikely that the few months remaining before the Paris Conference will allow enough time for the gap to be closed.
In law, climate justice refers to the concept of responsibility, its implementation aims to ensure respect for the law, attaching legal consequences to a failure to comply. However, this legal liability is multifaceted. Many actors may be considered responsible for climate change (States, individually or collectively, businesses, individuals, international institutions, etc...). 6 Furthermore, responsibility can vary depending on the nature of the obligations breached and the resultant consequences (international, domestic, contractual, tort, administrative, civil, criminal responsibility) and depending on the objectives (for contributing to the problem, to address it, to prevent it, to promote distributive justice, current or future, etc.). Finally, this responsibility may or may not be held through litigation, which if undertaken in climate cases does not necessarily aim to establish liability.
Internally, climate justice has indeed triggered a range of contentious action throughout the world. 7 However, lawsuits were not always filed in support to climate justice, in its moral 
The Subjectivization of Climate Justice Actors
Accepting that a private individual is entitled to demand accountability before national courts to challenge a State's climate policy, the District Court of The Hague contributes to the subjectivization of the interests pursued under climate justice (2.1). The Court's decision also allows the subjectivization of the agent of damage associated with climate change, by clearly distinguishing the State as a person with individual liability for climate justice (2.2).
Access to Climate Justice for Private Individuals
Drawing on its constitution, the NGO Urgenda has demonstrated sufficient interest in bringing proceedings to obtain access to a judge (2.1.1), even though it was denied the status as a victim of a human rights violation (2.1.2).
A Standing Based on the Specific Constitution of the NGO Urgenda
In the Netherlands, as in other domestic legal orders 13 , a natural or legal person has the opportunity to bring an action before a court if he/she demonstrates a sufficient interest in bringing proceedings in his/her application. 14 Thus, to bring an action before the court, a foundation or association can reference the protection of the collective interest it pursues, or justifies its action on behalf of intergenerational interest on the grounds that present-day State action/inaction regarding GHG emissions reduction will have a significant impact on future generations. The acceptance of this intergenerational dimension of the interest in bringing proceedings represents the Court's endorsement of the scientific argument that delaying action to mitigate climate change will clearly make the challenge more difficult, along with the irreversible nature of the consequences of past and current GHG emissions.
The District Court of The Hague thus recognized that the collective concern contained within Urgenda's constitution gave it an interest in bringing proceedings. Conversely, it did not recognize Urgenda to be a victim of a violation of human rights. Similarly, it avoided pushing the argument to the extreme by trying to identify exactly how GHG emissions from the Netherlands were influencing climate change, which could have been the case if it had sought to establish strictly proportionate liability. To avoid having to do so, it mobilized the international commitments of the Netherlands and the principle of equity,
A Standing Not Based on the Status of Victim of Human Rights Violations
considering that "in view of a fair distribution, the Netherlands, like other Annex I countries, has taken the lead in taking mitigation measures and has therefore committed to a more than proportionate contribution to reduction." Finally, the Court addressed the question of the temporal dimension of GHG emissions, with regard to future, not past, emissions, considering that "the excess greenhouse gas emission in the Netherlands that will occur between the present time and 2020 without further measures, can be attributed to the State."
The Attribution to the State of Emissions from its Territory
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The Court was therefore able to establish the subjective element of the act for which liability was incurred, determining that the State was an individual that must respond to Urgenda's demands. However, this subjective element alone was not sufficient to entail State liability, it was only through its association with the objective element of the act for which liability was incurred, that the subjective element became fully significant. 
Objectivization of State's Climate Liability
There are different interpretations of the objective nature of liability. In this commentary the expression is used to refer to the assumption of responsibility based on the commission of a wrongful act, conceived objectively, as a breach of the law, making it easier for the victim to fulfil his or her task in terms of the provision of evidence. The misconduct was not alien to the Dutch law of civil liability, however, it was not on these grounds that the judge chose to base his decision, but rather on the grounds of a damaging event which, under the law or generally accepted principles, could be attributable to the State due to the obligations it has liability for. 50 To do so, the judge had to first establish the fact that climate policy in the Netherlands is governed by a legal obligation of the State (3.1). This allowed him not only to reject the argument that controlling the GHG emissions reduction trajectory of the Netherlands was not purely a matter of political choice, but also to consider that the State was negligent by not making every effort to comply with this obligation, and this negligence entailed the involvement of its responsibility 51 (3.2).
The Basis of the Unlawfulness of the State's Climate Policy
To bring the civil liability of the State into play, 52 Urgenda had to establish that the State had acted (or failed to act) illegally, violating either a right claimed by Urgenda or a law, or by
failing to exhibit what can be considered under the unwritten "due care" principle as adequate social behaviour. 53 While the judge dismissed the first two assumptions (3.1.1), he retained, however, the third one (3.1.2). and the principle of non-harmful use of territory were not endowed with direct effect, so that a private individual could not rely on these provisions before the domestic courts.
The Impossibility of Founding the case on International Law, Human Rights and the
Constitution
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No doubt aware of the influence that its decision could have on other jurisdictions, it preferred to use these international standards more effectively, not referring to them directly but more strategically, as a background element to be taken into account in interpreting and applying internal law. 58 In essence, it justified this position in the light of the principles according to which regularly concluded international agreements must be executed by the parties in good faith 59 with consistent interpretation 60 but without expressly making reference to them. The District Court of The Hague subsequently specified that this reasoning also 14 To determine whether, as claimed by Urgenda, the State has a duty of care in respect of climate policy, the judge used a set of criteria 65 inspired by the case law on civil liability for endangering others 66 , as well as the objectives and principles of the UNFCCC and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU in relation to environmental issues. 67 The criteria related to the damage incurred and to the cost-effectiveness of the measures necessary for its prevention are especially interesting, to the extent that they encouraged the judge to apply the precautionary principle. The Court's interpretation of the precautionary principle proved decisive, firstly, in affirming the obligation of the State to protect its citizens from the consequences of climate change, thus framing its discretionary power under Article 21 of the Constitution, 68 and secondly, by giving substance to the State's duty of care in relation to climate matters.
As part of the determination of whether the State should be subject to a duty of care regarding climate issues, the Dutch judge firstly mobilized three criteria related to the damage incurred. The challenge here is that, in the field of climate change, the damage is uncertain.
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The judge circumvented this problem by not considering damage as the basis for the liability of the Netherlands, but rather as an index that could enable the assessment of the existence of a State's duty of care in climate matters, the ignorance of which would, as such, constitute a basis for the State's liability for negligence. This way of thinking endows liability with a preventive provision. In this context, the consideration of damage that is uncertain is more easily conceivable. It amounts to asking if -given the importance, the knowledge and the probability of the realization of the damage incurred -it can reasonably be considered that the State has a duty of care to prevent its realization, which was the case in this instance, The judge's decision did not order or prohibit the application of a particular measure or the adoption of a specific policy, the State retained its freedom 84 on how it complies with the standard of care set by the Court.
Setting a Standard of Due Care in relation to Climate Change
The Dutch court did not simply decide that the State had a duty of care regarding the climate. It also set precisely the standard required in this area. It thus ruled on the level of this obligation, indicating that the State had a "serious" duty of care 85 and that it must demonstrate a "high level" of care that would result in the establishment of an adequate and effective 79 §4.95. Compare with the ICJ's position that "whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to admit the legal character of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial task, namely, an assessment of the legality of the possible conduct of States with regard to the obligations imposed upon them by international law" (ICJ Advisory Opinion: Case Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 8 July 1996 8 July [1996 Rec-226, §13 Finally, the judge declared that the State's duty of care on climate implied that as many mitigation actions as possible were to be undertaken, as quickly as possible.
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The Court went even further, putting figures and dates in terms of consequences onto otherwise general statements. In this regard, the judge pursued the following reasoning: to prevent dangerous climate change, the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere must be maintained at less than 450 parts per million, because under this scenario, according to IPCC forecasts, there is the best chance of avoiding an average global temperature rise of over 2°C, beyond which irreversible damage will be realized. However, the current target of a 17%
reduction, compared to 1990 levels, in the GHG emissions of the Netherlands by 2020 is insufficient to comply with this scenario. An appropriate reduction for developing countries of between 25% and 40% by 2020, compared to 1990, having been set out at the Cancun Agreements. Accordingly, the judge concluded that the GHG emissions mitigation policy in the Netherlands, by not pursuing a reduction of at least 25% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, was contrary to the State's duty of care to the climate.
In doing so, it dismissed two arguments submitted as a defence by the State. First, it rejected the argument that, by fixing its current GHG emission reduction target, the Netherlands was acting in accordance with EU law, pointing out that the targets assigned to each Member State constituted a minimum. Indeed, although it may be difficult for the Netherlands to take action regarding the objectives of sectors covered by the trading system that is harmonized across the EU, the State has greater manoeuvre room in other sectors. 88 The
Court then rejected the argument that the 2030 time horizon objective of the EU and the Netherlands did in fact correspond with the IPCC scenario, considering that the delaying of
